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Abstract We study connections between optimistic bilevel programming prob-
lems and Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEP)s. We remark that,
with respect to bilevel problems, we consider the general case in which the
lower level program is not assumed to have a unique solution. Inspired by the
optimal value approach, we propose a new GNEP model that, in a level play-
ing field, incorporates some taste of hierarchy and turns out to be related to
the bilevel programming problem. We provide a complete theoretical analysis
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of the relationship between the vertical bilevel problem and our “uneven” hor-
izontal model: in particular, we define classes of problems for which solutions
of the bilevel program can be computed by finding equilibria of our GNEP.
Furthermore, from a modelistic standpoint, by referring to some applications
in economics, we show that our “uneven” horizontal model, in some sense, lies
between the vertical bilevel model and a “pure” horizontal game.
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1 Introduction
We aim at building a bridge between optimistic bilevel programming problems
and generalized Nash equilibrium problems. This kind of study, as far as we
are aware, has never been considered in the literature. In particular, we wish to
point out differences and similarities between two-level optimization and one-
level game models. Besides being of independent theoretical and modelistic
interest, this analysis gives a new perspective on bilevel problems.
Bilevel programming is a fruitful modeling framework that is widely used
in many fields, ranging from economy and engineering to natural sciences (see
[1], the fundamental [2], [3], the recent [4], the references therein, the seminal
paper [5], and [6,7] for recent applications). This problem has a hierarchical
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structure involving two decision, upper and lower , levels. We focus on the more
general and challenging case in which the lower level program is not assumed to
have a unique solution. We recall that, whenever lower level solutions are non-
uniquely determined, the definition itself of the bilevel program is ambiguous.
With this in mind, in this work we refer to the most common optimistic vision.
Roughly speaking, in optimistic bilevel problems a decision is taken, at the
upper level, by considering two blocks of variables, namely x and y; but, in
turn, y is implicitly constrained by the reaction of a subaltern (lower level)
part to the choice of x. Thus, bilevel programs can be viewed, in some sense,
as a special two-agents optimization. The two agents play here an asymmetric
role, in that the variable block x is controlled only by the upper level agent,
while the choice of the second block y is influenced by both the upper and
the lower level agents. It is precisely this asymmetrically shared influence on
the variable blocks that makes bilevel problems inherently hard to solve. It is
worth noting that, whenever there is not such a thorny relationship between
the agents, things become conceptually simpler. Indeed, on the one hand, if all
the variables are controlled by both the agents, we have a pure hierarchical
problem (in Section 3 we show that this problem has the same set of solutions
of a suitable one-level generalized Nash equilibrium problem); while, on the
other hand, with x being controlled by the upper level agent, if y is controlled
only by the lower level agent, we get a generalized Nash equilibrium problem,
in which the two agents act as players at the same level (see Section 2).
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Optimistic bilevel problems have been studied in two different versions (see
the next section and [8] for a rather complete discussion on this topic): the
Original optimistic Bilevel programming Problem (OBP) and the Standard
optimistic Bilevel programming Problem (SBP). As observed in [8,9], OBP
and SBP are equivalent in the global case but a local minimum of SBP may
not lead to a local solution of OBP. We underline that, besides [8], which deals
with OBPs, almost all other solution methods cope only with SBPs. The latter
problems are structurally nonconvex and nonsmooth (see [10]); furthermore,
it is hard to define suitable constraint qualification conditions for them, see,
e.g., [11,12]. In fact, the study of provably convergent and practically imple-
mentable algorithms for the solution of even just SBPs is still in its infancy
(see, for example, [3,8,13–21]), as also witnessed by the scarcity of results in
the literature. We remark that suitable reformulations of the SBP have been
proposed in order to investigate optimality conditions and constraint qualifi-
cations, as well as to devise suitable algorithmic approaches: to date, the most
studied and promising are optimal value and KKT one level reformulations
(see [4], the references therein and [22,23]). As far as the KKT reformulation
is concerned, it should be remarked that the SBP has often be considered as
a special case of Mathematical Program with Complementarity Constraints
(MPCC) (see, e.g., [24–26]). Actually, this is not the case, as shown in [27].
Indeed, in general, one can provably recast the SBP as an MPCC only when
the lower level problem is convex and Slater’s constraint qualification holds for
all x. Moreover, even in this case, a local solution of the MPCC, which is what
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one can expect to compute (since the MPCC is nonconvex), may happen not
to be a local optimal solution of the corresponding SBP and, even less, OBP.
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) is another important mod-
eling tool in multi-agent contexts. GNEPs, that, unlike SBPs, are problems in
which all agents act at the same level, have been extensively studied in the
literature and many methods have been proposed for their solutions in the last
decades, see, e.g., [28–33]. For further details, we refer the interested reader
to [34]. Finally, we would like to cite the interesting paper [35], which deals
with both bilevel problems and GNEPs but without establishing connections
between them, as we do.
In this work, building on the ideas set forth in [36], we propose a new
suitable GNEP model that is closely related to the SBP and proves to be
connected with the OBP also. Our GNEP model is, in some sense, inspired by
the optimal value approach, in that, when passing from the vertical structure
of bilevel problems to the horizontal format of GNEPs, we exploit the value
function idea to mimic the original relationship between the agents. Thus,
despite its one-level structure, the latter GNEP incorporates some taste of
hierarchy.
To be more specific, here we summarize the theoretical results about the
relationship between SBP/OBP and our GNEP model. In Theorem 3.1 we
show that an equilibrium of our GNEP gives a feasible and, at least, sub-
optimal (possibly global optimal under some suitable conditions) solution for
the corresponding SBP. With Proposition 3.1, we define a particular type of
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global solutions of the SBP that, in any case, can be computed by finding
an equilibrium of our GNEP. With Corollary 3.1 and with Theorem 3.2, we
identify classes of problems (including Stackelberg games and pure hierarchi-
cal optimization problems, see Remarks 3.1 and 3.2, respectively) for which
an equilibrium of our GNEP always leads to a global solution of the SBP.
We remind that global solutions of the SBP lead also to global solutions of
the OBP. Thus, the previous relations hold also between equilibria and global
optima of the OBP. In Subsection 3.2, we introduce the concept of strong lo-
cal minima of the SBP: unlike general local solutions of the SBP, strong local
minima enjoy the nice property to lead also to local solutions of the OBP
(see Proposition 3.2). With Theorem 3.3 we give sufficient conditions for an
equilibrium of our GNEP to lead to a strong local minimum of the SBP and,
thus, also to a local minimum of the OBP. Section 3 is equipped with several
examples: in particular, we wish to cite Example 3.4 in which we compare our
GNEP to the classical MPCC reformulation.
Relying on the previous theoretical results, in Section 4 we consider some
applications in economics to show that our “uneven” horizontal framework,
in some sense, lies between the vertical bilevel model and a “pure” horizon-
tal game. In a market with two firms producing some goods, we study the
system’s behavior in terms of outcomes values by employing three different
points of view: vertical (for which a firm is the leader and the other one is
the follower), horizontal (for which both firms act at the same level) and our
uneven horizontal.
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2 Preliminaries
We briefly recall some basic facts.
The Original optimistic Bilevel programming Problem (OBP) takes the
form
minimize
x
miny{F (x, y) : y ∈ S(x)}
s.t. x ∈ X,
(1)
while the Standard optimistic version (SBP) is the following:
minimize
x,y
F (x, y)
s.t. x ∈ X
y ∈ S(x),
(2)
where F : Rn1×Rn2 → R,X ⊆ Rn1 and the set-valued mapping S : Rn1 ⇉ Rn2
describes the solution set of the following lower level parametric optimization
problem:
minimize
w
f(x,w)
s.t. w ∈ U
g(x,w) ≤ 0,
(3)
where f : Rn1 × Rn2 → R and g : Rn1 × Rn2 → Rm and U ⊆ Rn2 .
When dealing with SBP/OBP (2)/(1) we rely on the following standard
assumptions: F, f : Rn1 × Rn2 → R and g : Rn1 × Rn2 → Rm are continuous,
and X ⊆ Rn1 and U ⊆ Rn2 are closed.
Let W := {(x, y) : x ∈ X, y ∈ S(x)} and U ∩ K(x), with K(x) :=
{v ∈ Rn2 : g(x, v) ≤ 0}, denote the feasible sets of SBP (2) and of lower level
problem (3), respectively.
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A point (x∗, y∗) is a global solution of SBP (2) if (x∗, y∗) ∈ W and
F (x∗, y∗) ≤ F (x, y), ∀ (x, y) ∈ W . More explicitly, feasibility and optimal-
ity of (x∗, y∗) can be equivalently rewritten in the following manner:
(x∗, y∗) ∈ X × U, f(x∗, y∗) ≤ f(x∗, y) ∀y ∈ U ∩K(x∗), g(x∗, y∗) ≤ 0 (4)
F (x∗, y∗) ≤ F (x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈W, (5)
where W =
{
(u, v) ∈ X ×U : f(u, v) ≤ f(u,w) ∀w ∈ U ∩K(u), g(u, v) ≤ 0
}
.
We would like to mention two particularly interesting and well-studied
classes of SBPs: (optimistic) Stackelberg games and pure hierarchical opti-
mization problems. Stackelberg games are SBPs in which function g does not
depend on the upper variables x. On the other hand, when, at the lower level,
the whole dependence on x is dropped, the SBP boils down to the following
pure hierarchical optimization problem:
minimize
x,y
F (x, y)
s.t. x ∈ X
y ∈ S,
(6)
where S denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
minimize
w
f(w)
w ∈ U
g(w) ≤ 0.
As we have pointed out in the introduction, the characteristic aspect of SBP
(2) is the hierarchical relationship between the leader and the follower: the two
agents play here an asymmetric role, in that the variable block x is controlled
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only by the upper level agent, while the second block y is controlled by both the
upper and the lower level agents. Question arises naturally on what happens
if the leader loses control on y. In the latter case, we get the following GNEP:
minimize
x
F (x, y) minimize
y
f(x, y)
s.t. x ∈ X s.t. y ∈ U
g(x, y) ≤ 0.
(7)
Note that in GNEP (7) the two agents are at the same level, unlike in SBP
(2).
One may think that in problem (7) the follower has been promoted at an
upper level, the same of the leader; but this is not the case: indeed, the follower
acts in the same manner in (2) and in (7). Is the leader who is downgraded at
the follower’s level: in fact, unlike problem (7), where the leader can no longer
directly control y, in SBP (2) the follower is like “a puppet in leader’s hands”.
Finally, we denote by N (x¯) the collection of open neighborhoods of x¯ and
by domM := {x |M(x) 6= ∅} the domain of M : Rn ⇉ Rm.
3 Taking Care of Hierarchy: a New GNEP Model
In the light of the observations in Section 2, we propose to address a GNEP
that better takes into account the original hierarchy between agents. With
the following GNEP, we aim at positioning the leader in an intermediate level
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between that in (7) and that in (2).
minimize
x,y
F (x, y) minimize
w
f(x,w)
s.t. (x, y) ∈ X × U s.t. w ∈ U
f(x, y) ≤ f(x,w) g(x,w) ≤ 0.
g(x, y) ≤ 0
(8)
We say that the player controlling x and y is the leader, while the other player
is the follower. Note that, in the leader’s problem, only the feasible set, in
particular constraint f(x, y) ≤ f(x,w), depends on the follower’s variables w;
on the other hand, as regards follower’s problem, the coupling with the leader’s
strategy may happen at both the objective and the feasible set levels.
GNEP (8) is related to the SBP/OBP, as the forthcoming considerations
clearly show (see Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, Proposition 3.1, Corollary 3.1 and Ex-
amples 3.1 and 3.2). We point out that, in order to devise GNEP (8), we draw
inspiration from the optimal value approach (see [4,22,23]). Indeed, the struc-
ture of leader’s feasible set in (8) (in particular, constraint f(x, y) ≤ f(x,w)) is
intended to mimic, in some sense, and to deal with the value function implicit
constraint f(x, y) ≤ ϕ(x), where
ϕ(x) := min
y
{f(x, y) : y ∈ K(x) ∩ U}
is the value function. In problem (8) the leader takes back control of variables
y: this fact and the presence of constraint f(x, y) ≤ f(x,w), introducing some
degree of hierarchy in a level playing field, keep memory of the original balance
of power between leader and follower.
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We note that, as one can expect, it is precisely the “difficult” constraint
f(x, y) ≤ f(x,w) that makes, in general, problem (8) not easily solvable:
because of the presence of such constraint, GNEP (8) may lack convexity
and suitable constraint qualifications are not readily at hand. However, as will
become evident in the subsequent sections, one can still define classes of bilevel
problems for which problem (8) is practically solvable.
Moreover, in view of the above considerations, GNEP (8) may also be con-
sidered as an alternative modeling tool, of independent interest, for describing
systems in which there is a hierarchical interaction between agents.
We denote by
T := {(x, y) ∈ X × U : g(x, y) ≤ 0} and U
the “private” constraints sets, and by
H(w) := {(x, y) ∈ Rn1 × Rn2 : f(x, y) ≤ f(x,w)} and K(x)
the “coupling” constraints sets of the leader and the follower, respectively.
Moreover, let V (w) := T ∩H(w) be the feasible set of the leader.
A solution, or an equilibrium, of GNEP (8) is a triple (x∗, y∗, w∗) such that
(x∗, y∗) ∈ X × U, f(x∗, y∗) ≤ f(x∗, w∗), g(x∗, y∗) ≤ 0, (9)
F (x∗, y∗) ≤ F (x, y), ∀ (x, y) ∈ V (w∗), (10)
w∗ ∈ U, g(x∗, w∗) ≤ 0, (11)
f(x∗, w∗) ≤ f(x∗, w), ∀w ∈ U ∩K(x∗), (12)
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where V (w∗) =
{
(u, v) ∈ X×U : f(u, v) ≤ f(u,w∗), g(u, v) ≤ 0
}
. Conditions
(9)-(10) and (11)-(12) state feasibility and optimality of (x∗, y∗, w∗) for leader’s
problem and for follower’s problem, respectively.
3.1 Global Solutions
The following Theorem 3.1 allows us to establish relations between equilibria
of GNEP (8) and global solutions of SBP (2) and, thus, of OBP (1). On the
one hand, Theorem 3.1 gives a sufficient condition for an equilibrium of GNEP
(8) to lead to a global solution of the SBP/OBP; on the other hand, as the
subsequent developments in this section clearly show, it provides a theoretical
base to define classes of bilevel problems that are tightly connected to the
GNEP (see Corollary 3.1, Theorem 3.2, and Remarks 3.1 and 3.2).
Theorem 3.1 Let (x∗, y∗, w∗) be an equilibrium of GNEP (8). Then
(i) (x∗, y∗) is a feasible point for SBP (2), that is (x∗, y∗) ∈ W ;
(ii) if g(x,w∗) ≤ 0 for all x such that there exists y with (x, y) ∈ W and
F (x, y) ≤ F (x∗, y∗), then (x∗, y∗) is a global solution of SBP (2).
Proof Under the assumptions of the theorem, (x∗, y∗, w∗) satisfy relations (9)-
(12).
(i) We observe that (9), (11) and (12) together imply that (x∗, y∗) satisfies
(4), that is (x∗, y∗) ∈ W .
A Bridge between Bilevel Programs and Nash Games 13
(ii) We need to show that (5) holds at (x∗, y∗). Let us denote by L∗ the
level set of F at (x∗, y∗), and by (L∗)c its complement:
L∗ := {(x, y) ∈ Rn1 × Rn2 : F (x, y) ≤ F (x∗, y∗)} , (13)
(L∗)c := {(x, y) ∈ Rn1 × Rn2 : F (x, y) > F (x∗, y∗)} . (14)
Let (x¯, y¯) be any couple in W ∩ L∗: by assumptions, we have g(x¯, w∗) ≤ 0.
Therefore, w∗ ∈ U ∩K(x¯) and, since (x¯, y¯) ∈ W , in turn (x¯, y¯) ∈ V (w∗) and
W ∩ L∗ ⊆ V (w∗). (15)
Thanks to (10) and (15), and noting that for every (x, y) ∈W ∩ (L∗)c we have
F (x, y) > F (x∗, y∗), (5) holds at (x∗, y∗). Hence, (x∗, y∗) is a global solution
of SBP (2). ⊓⊔
It is worth noticing that condition (ii) also suggests that (x∗, y∗) can be inter-
preted as a suboptimal point for SBP (2). Indeed, we have F (x∗, y∗) ≤ F (x, y)
for every (x, y) ∈W with x such that g(x,w∗) ≤ 0.
The following example gives a picture of the relationship between GNEP
(8) and SBP (2), as stated in Theorem 3.1.
Example 3.1 Let us consider the following SBP:
minimize
x,y
x2 + y2
s.t. x ≥ 1
y ∈ S(x),
(16)
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where S(x) denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
minimize
w
w
x+ w ≥ 1,
and the corresponding GNEP, that is,
minimize
x,y
x2 + y2 minimize
w
w
s.t. x ≥ 1 s.t. x+ w ≥ 1.
y ≤ w
x+ y ≥ 1
(17)
Point (1, 0) is the unique solution of problem (16), while all the infinitely many
points (1−λ, λ, λ), with λ ≤ 0, are equilibria of GNEP (17). In particular, we
remark that (1, 0, 0) is the only solution of GNEP (17) that satisfies assumption
(ii) of Theorem 3.1 (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). ⊓⊔
Fig. 1 The feasible set W and the unique
solution of SBP (16)
Fig. 2 A sketch of leader’s problem in
GNEP (17): the feasible set V (w) and the
corresponding solution are depicted for dif-
ferent values of w, namely w = 0 and w =
−1.
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It should be remarked (see Example 3.2) that the implications in Theorem 3.1
(ii) can not be reversed: indeed, in general, given a global solution (x∗, y∗) of
SBP (2), (x∗, y∗, y∗) may not be an equilibrium for GNEP (8).
Fig. 3 The feasible set W and the unique
solution of SBP (18)
Fig. 4 A sketch of leader’s problem in
GNEP (19): the feasible set V (w), which
turns out to be a superset of W , and the
corresponding solution are depicted for w =
1/2.
Example 3.2 Let us consider the following SBP:
minimize
x,y
x2 + y2
s.t. y ∈ S(x),
(18)
where S(x) denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
minimize
w
(x+ w − 1)2
and the corresponding GNEP
minimize
x,y
x2 + y2 minimize
w
(x+ w − 1)2.
s.t. (x+ y − 1)2 ≤ (x+ w − 1)2
(19)
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The unique solution of problem (18) is (x∗, y∗) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. However, the triple
(x∗, y∗, w∗) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
)
is not an equilibrium of GNEP (19), since point
(x˜, y∗, w∗) =
(
0, 1
2
, 1
2
)
is feasible for the first player and x˜2 + (y∗)2 < (x∗)2 +
(y∗)2 (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). ⊓⊔
On the other hand, as also observed in [37], strengthening conditions in The-
orem 3.1, one can define points for which the relation between SBP (2) and
GNEP (8) is stronger than that already established.
Proposition 3.1 Let (x∗, y∗) belong to W and be such that
F (x∗, y∗) ≤ F (x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ T. (20)
Then
(i) (x∗, y∗) is a global solution of SBP (2);
(ii) for all w∗ ∈ U∩K(x∗) such that (x∗, w∗) ∈ H(y∗), (x∗, y∗, w∗) is a solution
of GNEP (8).
Proof (i) Condition (20) implies relation (5) since W ⊆ T .
(ii) Relations (9), (11) and (12) follow from (4) and the fact that w∗ ∈ U ,
g(x∗, w∗) ≤ 0 and f(x∗, w∗) = f(x∗, y∗). Moreover, (20) implies (10) since
V (w∗) ⊆ T . ⊓⊔
Points that satisfy conditions (20) can be considered as “easy” global solutions
of SBP (2) and, thus, lead also to global solutions of OBP (1): such points lie
inW but, as for optimality (see relation (5)), the lower level objective function
plays no role for these solutions to be computed. Clearly, if (x∗, y∗) is an “easy”
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solution of SBP (2), then, in view of (ii), (x∗, y∗, y∗) is an equilibrium of GNEP
(8).
In the following example, we present an SBP whose unique solution satisfies
the assumptions in Proposition 3.1.
Example 3.3 Let us consider the following SBP:
minimize
x,y1,y2
x2 + (y1 + y2)
2
s.t. x ≥ 1
2
(y1, y2) ∈ S(x),
(21)
where S(x) denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
minimize
w1,w2
w1
x+ w1 + w2 ≥ 1
w1, w2 ≥ 0.
The corresponding GNEP.
minimize
x,y1,y2
x2 + (y1 + y2)
2 minimize
w1,w2
w1
s.t. x ≥ 1
2
s.t. x+ w1 + w2 ≥ 1
y1 ≤ w1 w1, w2 ≥ 0,
x+ y1 + y2 ≥ 1
y1, y2 ≥ 0
(22)
Clearly,
(
1
2
, 0, 1
2
)
is the unique solution of problem (21), while
(
1
2
, 0, 1
2
, 0, 1
2
)
is
an equilibrium of GNEP (22); furthermore,
(
1
2
, 0, 1
2
)
satisfies the assumptions
in Proposition 3.1. It is worth pointing out that “easy” solution
(
1
2
, 0, 1
2
)
can
not be calculated by simply minimizing F (x, y) over set T : if we did this,
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indeed, we would obtain multiple solutions, namely any point
(
1
2
, y1, y2
)
such
that y1+y2 =
1
2
and y1, y2 ≥ 0. But, among these points, only
(
1
2
, 0, 1
2
)
belongs
to W . Thus, actually, the “easy” solutions are not so easy to be calculated!
Indeed, although, for optimality, the lower level objective function plays no
role for these points to be computed, nonetheless the “easy” solutions must
belong to the feasible set W . ⊓⊔
Clearly, as stated above, in general, solving GNEP (8) may happen not to
lead to a solution of SBP (2). However, Theorem 3.1, as well as Proposition
3.1, establish sufficient conditions for an equilibrium of GNEP (8) to provide
a global solution of SBP/OBP (2)/(1). Relying on these conditions, with the
following Corollary 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 we present two significant classes
of problems for which one can establish an even deeper connection between
global solutions of SBP/OBP (2)/(1) and those of GNEP (8).
For example, if the lower level feasible set does not depend on upper level
variables x, then the requirements of Theorem 3.1 (ii) are trivially satisfied
and the following result, whose proof is omitted, holds.
Corollary 3.1 Suppose that, at the lower level, the feasible set mapping U∩K
is fixed in X ∩ dom(U ∩ K). If (x∗, y∗, w∗) is an equilibrium of GNEP (8),
then (x∗, y∗) is a global solution of SBP (2).
Remark 3.1 The class of SBPs in which function g does not depend on the
upper variables x, in view of the previous corollary, can be solved by addressing
GNEP (8), whenever at least an equilibrium exists. Note that Stackelberg
games (see Section 2) belong to this category of problems.
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We point out that, as Example 3.2 shows, also the implications in Corollary
3.1 can not be reversed: given a global solution (x∗, y∗) of SBP (2), (x∗, y∗, y∗)
may not be an equilibrium for GNEP (8), even when the lower level feasible set
does not depend on upper level variables x. On the other hand, this is not the
case whenever, at the lower level, the solution set mapping S is fixed. Indeed,
for this class of problems, the implications in Theorem 3.1 (ii) can actually be
reversed.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that, at the lower level, the solution set mapping S is
fixed in X ∩ dom(U ∩K). The following implications hold:
(i) if (x∗, y∗, w∗) is an equilibrium of GNEP (8), then (x∗, y∗) is a global
solution of SBP (2);
(ii) if (x∗, y∗) is a global solution of SBP (2), then, for all w∗ ∈ U such that
g(x∗, w∗) ≤ 0 and f(x∗, w∗) = f(x∗, y∗), (x∗, y∗, w∗) is a solution of GNEP
(8).
Proof In view of relations (4), (5) and (9)-(12), in both cases, it suffices to show
that, for every x ∈ X ∩dom(U ∩K), f(x,w∗) = miny{f(x, y) : y ∈ K(x)∩U}
and, thus, W = V (w∗).
(i) The claim follows easily observing that w∗ ∈ S(x∗).
(ii) Clearly, y∗ ∈ S(x∗) but, since w∗ ∈ U, g(x∗, w∗) ≤ 0 and f(x∗, y∗) =
f(x∗, w∗), we also have w∗ ∈ S(x∗). ⊓⊔
Remark 3.2 Whenever in SBP (2), at the lower level, the whole dependence
on x is dropped, the solution set mapping S is obviously fixed. Thus, pure
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hierarchical program (6) belonging to this category of problems, can equiva-
lently be reformulated as the following simple GNEP in which the coupling
between leader’s and follower’s problems occurs only at the leader’s feasible
set level:
minimize
x,y
F (x, y) minimize
w
f(w)
s.t. (x, y) ∈ X × U s.t. w ∈ U
f(y) ≤ f(w) g(w) ≤ 0.
g(y) ≤ 0
(23)
Here we consider a particularly interesting example of SBP with a fixed lower
level solution set mapping.
Example 3.4 (see [27]) Let us consider the following SBP:
minimize
x,y
(x− 1)2 + y2
s.t. y ∈ S(x),
(24)
where S(x) denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
minimize
w
x2 w
w2 ≤ 0.
Note that the unique solution of (24) is (1, 0).
Interestingly, as shown in [27], solving the MPCC reformulation of SBP
(24) invariably leads to point (0, 0), which is not the solution of the original
problem. In this case, the MPCC reformulation fails to identify the set of
solutions of the SBP, due to the lack of regularity (Slater’s condition) in the
lower level feasible set (see [27]). Our GNEP, instead, in view of the previous
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result, effectively provides the unique solution of SBP (24). Indeed, it is worth
remarking that, in order to address SBP/OBP (2)/(1) by means of GNEP (8),
we do not need any convexity or regularity preliminary assumption. ⊓⊔
3.2 Strong Local Solutions
SBPs are inherently nonconvex (see [10]), so that multiple local optimal solu-
tions may occur. We say that (x∗, y∗) is a strong local solution of SBP (2) if
(x∗, y∗) ∈W and there exists a neighborhood N∗ ∈ N (x∗) of x∗ such that
F (x∗, y∗) ≤ F (x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈W ∩ (N∗ × Rn2). (25)
Of course, global solutions are strong local solutions of SBP (2). As the fol-
lowing example clearly shows, even if the lower level problem is linear and the
upper level objective function is strongly convex, the resulting SBP may be
nonconvex. Moreover, in this case, strong local solutions that are not global
occur.
Example 3.5 Let us consider the following SBP:
minimize
x,y
x2 + y2
s.t. −1 ≤ x ≤ 1
y ∈ S(x),
(26)
where S(x) denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
minimize
w
−w
2x+ w ≤ 2
0 ≤ w ≤ 1.
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Point
(
4
5
, 2
5
)
is the global solution of problem (26), while (0, 1) is a strong local
solution of SBP (26) that is not global. ⊓⊔
We point out that strong local solutions are obviously local solutions for SBP
(2). The converse, in general, is not true, see the following example.
Example 3.6 (see [9]) Consider the following SBP
minimize
x,y
x
s.t. −1 ≤ x ≤ 1
y ∈ S(x),
(27)
where S(x) denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
minimize
w
xw
0 ≤ w ≤ 1.
Point (0, 0) is a local solution that is not strong. Moreover, notice that the
unique global minimum (−1, 1) is an “easy” global solution of SBP (27) (see
Proposition 3.1). ⊓⊔
Strong local solutions can be considered as “asymmetric” local solutions, since,
in some sense, variables x play there a more important role. Interestingly, any
strong local solution of SBP (2), which is precisely what we seek for, leads to
a local solution of OBP (1), unlike generic local solutions of SBP (2) (see [9]).
Proposition 3.2 Let (x∗, y∗) ∈ W be a strong local solution of SBP (2).
Then x∗ is a local solution of OBP (1).
Proof Since (x∗, y∗) ∈ W and there exists a neighborhood N∗ ∈ N (x∗)
of x∗ such that F (x∗, y∗) ≤ F (x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ W ∩ (N∗ × Rn2), we have
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miny{F (x∗, y) : y ∈ S(x∗)} = F (x∗, y∗) ≤ miny{F (x, y) : y ∈ S(x)} ∀x ∈
X ∩N∗. Hence, x∗ is a local solution of (1). ⊓⊔
We are now in a position to restate Theorem 3.1 (ii) in a local sense. Prelimi-
narily, let I(x, y) := {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : gi(x, y) = 0} be the active index set for
constraints g at (x, y).
Theorem 3.3 Let (x∗, y∗, w∗) be an equilibrium of GNEP (8). If, for every
i ∈ I(x∗, w∗), there exists a neighborhood N∗ ∈ N (x∗) of x∗ with gi(x,w∗) ≤ 0
for all x ∈ N∗ such that there exists y with (x, y) ∈ W and F (x, y) ≤ F (x∗, y∗),
then (x∗, y∗) is a strong local solution of SBP (2).
Proof Since (x∗, y∗, w∗) is an equilibrium of GNEP (8), it satisfies relations
(9)-(12). Our aim is to show that (4) and (25) hold at (x∗, y∗).
As done in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we observe that (9), (11) and (12)
together imply that (x∗, y∗) satisfies (4): thus, (x∗, y∗) is feasible for SBP (2).
We recall that, by (11), we have g(x∗, w∗) ≤ 0; let, without loss of general-
ity, N∗ be such that gj(x,w
∗) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ N∗ and for every j /∈ I(x∗, w∗).
For any couple (x¯, y¯) in W ∩ (N∗ × Rn2) ∩ L∗ (for the definition of sets
L∗ and (L∗)c, see (13) and (14)) we have, by assumptions, gi(x¯, w∗) ≤ 0 for
every i ∈ I(x∗, w∗). Therefore, since we have also gj(x¯, w∗) ≤ 0 for every
j /∈ I(x∗, w∗), in view of (11), we get w∗ ∈ U ∩K(x¯). Inclusions (x¯, y¯) ∈ W
and w∗ ∈ U ∩K(x¯) entail (x¯, y¯) ∈ V (w∗) and, in turn,
W ∩ (N∗ × Rn2) ∩ L∗ ⊆ V (w∗). (28)
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Thanks to (10) and (28), and noting that for every (x, y) ∈ W ∩ (N∗×Rn2)∩
(L∗)c we have F (x, y) > F (x∗, y∗), (25) holds at (x∗, y∗). Hence, (x∗, y∗) is a
strong local solution of SBP (2). ⊓⊔
We remark that, while Example 3.2 shows that a strong (local) solution of
SBP may not lead to an equilibrium of the corresponding GNEP, if conditions
in Theorem 3.3 are satisfied, an equilibrium of GNEP (8) always provides us
with a strong (local) solution of SBP (2).
Example 3.7 Let us consider again the problem in Example 3.5; the corre-
sponding GNEP is the following:
minimize
x,y
x2 + y2 minimize
w
−w
s.t. −1 ≤ x ≤ 1 2x+ w ≤ 2
y ≥ w 0 ≤ w ≤ 1.
2x+ y ≤ 2
0 ≤ y ≤ 1
(29)
Point (0, 1, 1) is an equilibrium of the convex GNEP (29). Moreover, it trivially
satisfies assumptions of Theorem 3.3, since constraint 2x+w ≤ 2 is not active
at (0, 1). ⊓⊔
4 Applications in Economics
Let us consider a market with two firms, each acting as a player. Firm 1
produces quantities q1 ∈ Rn1 of some goods, while firm 2 produces quantities
q2 ∈ Rn2 of other goods. Given private technological constraints Xν on the
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production level, each player ν = 1, 2 sets qν in order to maximize its own
profit
Πν(q
1, q2) := pν(q1, q2)T qν − cν(q
1, q2),
where pν and cν are inverse demand and cost functions, respectively. We as-
sume sets X1 and X2 to be convex, compact and nonempty, and functions Π1
and Π2 to be continuously differentiable and concave with respect to (q
1, q2)
and q2, respectively. In this setting, two different classical perspectives can be
considered.
Horizontal model: both players decide their strategies qν simultaneously; we
assume that the players act rationally and have complete information, and
there is no explicit collusion; we model this case as a “standard” GNEP;
Vertical model: player 1 can anticipate player 2 by setting its variables q1 for
first; we model this case as an SBP.
We illustrate that, in order to model this system, one can also rely on our new
GNEP (8), which in some sense lies in between the horizontal and the vertical
models. We call our GNEP uneven horizontal model.
In the following subsections, considering different instances of the described
framework, we highlight the connections between the three models.
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4.1 Π2 not Depending on q
1
Assume that Π2 does not depend on q
1. From an horizontal point of view, the
system can be modeled by resorting to the following “standard” GNEP:
maximize
q1
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
q2
Π2(q
2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1 s.t. q2 ∈ X2.
In a vertical framework, one can rely to the classical (hierarchical) optimization
problem
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1
q2 ∈ S,
where S denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
maximize
w2
Π2(w
2)
s.t. w2 ∈ X2.
Finally, a new intermediate perspective can be given by the uneven horizontal
GNEP model
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
w2
Π2(w
2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1, q2 ∈ X2 s.t. w2 ∈ X2.
Π2(q
2) ≥ Π2(w
2)
Let us introduce the following sets of values:
ΠHorizontal1 is the range of values of Π1 with respect to the solution set of the
horizontal model: given an equilibrium (q˜1, q˜2) of the horizontal model, we
have Π1(q˜
1, q˜2) ∈ ΠHorizontal
1
;
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ΠUneven
1
is the range of values of Π1 with respect to the solution set of the
uneven horizontal model: given an equilibrium (q¯1, q¯2, w¯2) of the uneven
horizontal model, we have Π1(q¯
1, q¯2) ∈ ΠUneven
1
;
ΠV ertical
1
is the optimal value of the vertical model.
By assumptions,ΠHorizontal
1
(see [38]) is compact and nonempty, whileΠUneven
1
and ΠV ertical1 are singletons. Then, the connections between the three mod-
elistic perspectives can be expressed by the following straightforward relations
(see also Theorem 3.2):
max{ΠHorizontal1 } = Π
Uneven
1 = Π
V ertical
1 .
Remark 4.1 It should be remarked that ΠUneven1 can be computed by simply
finding the optimal value Π∗2 of the follower’s problem and then addressing
the optimization problem
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1, q2 ∈ X2
Π2(q
2) ≥ Π∗
2
.
4.2 Π2 not Depending on q
1 and Players Sharing a Budget Constraint
In the same setting of subsection 4.1, let players also share a common re-
source. Thus, for every player, we consider the additional budget constraint
a1(q
1) + a2(q
2) ≤ b, where convex function aν (ν = 1, 2) indicates the re-
source consumption to produce quantities qν and scalar b > 0 is the amount
of resource available in the market. We assume set {q1 ∈ X1, q2 ∈ X2 :
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a1(q
1) + a2(q
2) ≤ b} to be nonempty. In an horizontal framework we have:
maximize
q1
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
q2
Π2(q
2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1 s.t. q2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) + a2(q
2) ≤ b a1(q1) + a2(q2) ≤ b,
as for the vertical model we get:
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1
q2 ∈ S(q1),
where S(q1) denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
maximize
w2
Π2(w
2)
s.t. w2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) + a2(w
2) ≤ b.
In the uneven horizontal vision, we have:
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
w2
Π2(w
2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1, q2 ∈ X2 s.t. w2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) + a2(q
2) ≤ b a1(q1) + a2(w2) ≤ b.
Π2(q
2) ≥ Π2(w
2)
In order to point out the relations between the models, in this case it is useful to
resort to the resource-directed parameterization introduced (for jointly convex
GNEPs) in [39] and in [31]. Let b1 ∈ B :=
{
b1 ∈ R : 0 ≤ b1 ≤ b, {q1 ∈ X1 :
a1(q
1) ≤ b1} 6= ∅ and {q2 ∈ X2 : a2(q2) ≤ b − b1} 6= ∅
}
be the amount of
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resource given to player 1; on the other hand, b − b1 ≥ 0 turns out to be the
amount of resource available to player 2. We get the following parameterized
version of the horizontal model:
maximize
q1
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
q2
Π2(q
2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1 s.t. q2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) ≤ b1 a2(q2) ≤ b− b1.
As parameterized vertical model we have
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1
a1(q
1) ≤ b1
q2 ∈ Sb1 ,
where Sb1 denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
maximize
w2
Π2(w
2)
s.t. w2 ∈ X2
a2(w
2) ≤ b − b1.
And the corresponding parameterized uneven horizontal version is
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
w2
Π2(w
2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1, q2 ∈ X2 s.t. w2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) ≤ b1 a2(w2) ≤ b − b1.
a2(q
2) ≤ b− b1
Π2(q
2) ≥ Π2(w2)
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As done for sets ΠHorizontal
1
, ΠUneven
1
and ΠV ertical
1
(see subsection 4.1), let
us define the following sets of values:
ΠHorizontal1 (b1) is the range of values of Π1 with respect to the solution set
of the parameterized horizontal model: given an equilibrium (q˜1, q˜2) of
the parameterized horizontal model with b1 ∈ B, we have Π1(q˜1, q˜2) ∈
ΠHorizontal
1
(b1);
ΠUneven1 (b1) is the range of values of Π1 with respect to the solution set of the
parameterized uneven horizontal model: given an equilibrium (q¯1, q¯2, w¯2) of
the parameterized uneven horizontal model with b1 ∈ B, we haveΠ1(q¯1, q¯2) ∈
ΠUneven
1
(b1);
ΠV ertical1 (b1) is the optimal value of the parameterized vertical model with
b1 ∈ B.
Similarly to what observed in subsection 4.1, by assumptions, ΠHorizontal1 (b1)
is compact and nonempty, while ΠUneven
1
(b1) and Π
V ertical
1
(b1) are single-
tons for every b1 ∈ B. In this case ΠHorizontal1 is nonempty since at least a
variational equilibrium exists, see [34]. As for ΠUneven1 , let us assume that
an equilibrium of the uneven horizontal model exists, thus making ΠUneven1
nonempty. We observe that, by relying for example on Ichiishi’s theorem, the
latter assumption holds under mild conditions, see, again, [34] (and also Re-
mark 4.2); we do not go into details, since this aspect is immaterial to our
analysis. Finally, as in the previous case, ΠV ertical1 is a singleton.
For all b1 ∈ B, we have
max{ΠHorizontal
1
(b1)} = Π
Uneven
1
(b1) = Π
V ertical
1
(b1). (30)
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Furthermore, by Theorem 3.1, we get
sup{ΠHorizontal
1
} ≤ sup{ΠUneven
1
} ≤ ΠV ertical
1
. (31)
Interestingly, relations (30) and (31) can be linked to each other according to
the following Propositions 4.1 and 4.2.
Proposition 4.1 ⋃
b1∈B
ΠV ertical
1
(b1) ∋ Π
V ertical
1
.
Proof Let (q̂1, q̂2) be a solution of the vertical model. With b̂1 := a1(q̂
1) ∈ B,
we have S(q̂1) = S
b̂1
. Then, in turn, since (q̂1, q̂2) is optimal for the parame-
terized vertical model with b1 = b̂1, the thesis follows. ⊓⊔
In view of the previous result and since ΠUneven
1
(b1) = Π
V ertical
1
(b1), we also
have ⋃
b1∈B
ΠUneven
1
(b1) ∋ Π
V ertical
1
. (32)
Proposition 4.2 If, for every solution (q̂1, q̂2) of the parameterized horizontal
model for b1 = b̂1 ∈ B, a1(q̂1) = b̂1 and a2(q̂2) = b− b̂1, then
sup
b1∈B
ΠUneven1 (b1) = Π
V ertical
1 .
Proof Thanks to [39, Theorem 3.6],
⋃
b1∈B
ΠHorizontal
1
(b1) = Π
Horizontal
1
, and,
in turn,
sup
b1∈B
max{ΠHorizontal
1
(b1)} = sup
{ ⋃
b1∈B
max{ΠHorizontal
1
(b1)}
}
≤ sup
{ ⋃
b1∈B
ΠHorizontal
1
(b1)
}
= sup{ΠHorizontal
1
}.
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Therefore, in view of (30) and (31),
sup
b1∈B
ΠUneven1 (b1) ≤ Π
V ertical
1 ,
and the thesis follows by (32). ⊓⊔
We remark that assumptions in Proposition 4.2 simply require that, for every
choice of b1 ∈ B, the common resource is entirely consumed by the players.
Remark 4.2 As for the parameterized uneven horizontal game, ΠUneven
1
(b1)
can be computed, for every fixed b1 ∈ B, by relying again on the very simple
approach described in Remark 4.1. Furthermore, one can also calculate a single
value belonging to ΠUneven1 by resorting to a similar procedure as the one just
illustrated (but, in general, with more than one leader/follower optimization).
It can be proved that this alternating optimization approach converges to an
equilibrium of the uneven horizontal game under mild standard conditions.
For the sake of brevity and since this kind of study goes out of the scope of
this work, we do not go into details.
4.3 Π2 Depending on Both q
1 and q2, and Players Sharing a Budget
Constraint
Let us consider the general case in which Π2 depends also on q
1 and players
share a common budget constraint as in subsection 4.2. Both the horizontal
maximize
q1
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
q2
Π2(q
1, q2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1 s.t. q2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) + a2(q
2) ≤ b a1(q1) + a2(q2) ≤ b,
A Bridge between Bilevel Programs and Nash Games 33
and the uneven horizontal
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
w2
Π2(q
1, w2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1, q2 ∈ X2 s.t. w2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) + a2(q
2) ≤ b a1(q1) + a2(w2) ≤ b,
Π2(q
1, q2) ≥ Π2(q1, w2)
models are GNEPs. Clearly, in order to establish connections between the
vertical
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1
q2 ∈ S(q1),
where S(q1) denotes the solution set of the lower level problem
maximize
w2
Π2(q
1, w2)
s.t. w2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) + a2(w
2) ≤ b,
and the uneven horizontal models, one can resort to Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, or,
if there is no budget (shared) constraint, to Corollary 3.1. In any case (see the
definitions introduced in subsection 4.1), we have
sup{ΠHorizontal1 } ≤ sup{Π
Uneven
1 } ≤ Π
V ertical
1 .
Let us consider now the interesting case in which one wants to design the
market in order to easily compute a solution of the vertical model. For this to
be done, one can exploit Proposition 3.1: letting (q̂1, q̂2, ŵ2) be a solution of
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the following (jointly convex) GNEP
maximize
q1,q2
Π1(q
1, q2) maximize
w2
Π2(q
1, w2)
s.t. q1 ∈ X1, q2 ∈ X2 s.t. w2 ∈ X2
a1(q
1) + a2(q
2) ≤ b a1(q1) + a2(w2) ≤ b,
such that Π2(q̂
1, q̂2) ≥ Π2(q̂1, ŵ2), (q̂1, q̂2) is an easy solution (see Proposition
3.1) of the vertical model. In the same spirit, an alternative and easier way to
compute such solutions makes use of variational inequalities: indeed, (q̂1, q̂2) ∈
T = {(q1, q2) ∈ X1 ×X2 : a1(q1) + a2(q2) ≤ b} such that, ∀ (q1, q2) ∈ T ,
∇Π1(q̂
1, q̂2)T
(
(q1, q2)− (q̂1, q̂2)
)
≤ 0, ∇q2Π2(q̂
1, q̂2)T
(
q2 − q̂2
)
≤ 0,
is an easy solution of the vertical model.
5 Conclusions
We introduce a new “uneven” horizontal GNEP model that takes into account
a hierarchical relationship between the players. Our analysis allows, as fare as
we are aware for the first time in the literature, to state new fruitful connections
between bilevel programs and GNEPs. Furthermore, in order to highlight the
significance of the new model, considering some applications in economics,
we show that our “uneven” horizontal GNEP, from a modelistic standpoint,
lies between the vertical (bilevel problem) and the pure horizontal (GNEP)
perspectives.
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